

# Performance Budgeting in the UK

Ten Lessons from a Decade of Experience

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# OUTLINE



### I. Performance Budgeting in the UK

- a. UK Public Spending Framework
- b. Multi-year Spending Reviews
- c. Public Service Agreements

### II. Lessons from a Decade of Experience

- a. Choosing Performance Indicators
- b. Monitoring Departments' Progress
- c. Holding the Government to Account
- d. Linking Performance Back to Spending Decisions



# I.a. UK Public Spending Framework


- Fundamental reform of fiscal & spending framework in 1998
  - New Labour Government elected in 1997
  - Code for Fiscal Stability enacted in 1998
- Two medium-term fiscal rules
  - Golden Rule: Balance the current budget over the economic cycle
  - Sustainable Investment Rule: Keep net debt below 40% of GDP
- Bi/triennial "zero-based" Spending Reviews
  - Fiscal rules determine overall expenditure envelopes for the exercise
  - Three-year spending limits fixed for each Department
  - Spending Reviews in 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2007
- Public Service Agreements (PSAs)
  - Comprehensive performance management framework for public services
  - Multi-year, outcome-based "contract" with each Department
  - Targets fixed as part of Spending Review exercise



# I.b. Multi-annual Spending Reviews


#### **Annually Managed Expenditure (AME)**

- £256bn (40% of total spending)
- Volatile or demand-led expenditure
- Managed on an annual basis



#### **Departmental Expenditure Limits (DEL)**


- £361bn (60% of total spending)
- 3-year fixed Departmental budgets
- 90% current and 10% capital



# I.b. The Spending Review Cycle:




5th SR concluded in October 07 and fixed DELs out to 2010-11



## I.c. Public Service Agreements:

#### A performance-based "contract" with Departments





# II. 10 Lessons from a Decade of UK Experience with Performance Budgeting



a. Choosing Performance Indicators

b. Monitoring Departments' Progress

c. Holding the Government to Account

d. Linking Performance Back to Spending Decisions

#### II.a. Choosing Performance Indicators

#### **Lesson # 1:** Choose objectives with political resonance




# Labour Party Manifesto's Five Pledges for 1997 Election

- 1. Cut class sizes to 30 or under for 5, 6 and 7 year-olds
- 2. Cut NHS waiting lists by treating an extra 100,000 patients
- 3. Halve the time from arrest to sentencing for persistent young offenders
- 4. Get 250,000 under-25 year-olds off benefit and into work
- 5. No rise in income tax rates and inflation and interest rates as low as possible







#### **II.a. Choosing Performance Indicators**

#### **Lesson # 2:** Don't have too many targets



Spe	ending
Rev	view:

Spending Review 1998

**CSR 98** 

Spending Review 2000

**SR00** 

Spending Review 2002

**SR02** 

Spending Review 2004

**SR04** 

Spending Review 2007

CSR07

# of PSAs:

300+

160

130

110

30

#### **II.a. Choosing Performance Indicators**

#### Lesson # 3: Don't let the great be the enemy of the good



Spending
Review:

Spending Review 1998

**CSR 98** 

Spending Review 2000

SR00

Spending Review 2002

SR02

Spending Review 2004

SR04

Spending Review 2007

CSR07



s: 300+

)+ 1

160

130


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
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
#### Focus:


Outcome

Input
















## **Boundary:**


Interdept'l

Dept'l

#### **II.b. Monitoring Departmental Performance**


**Lesson # 4:** Give yourself time to improve outcomes (and even longer to know if you have)





In transport, 'leaves on the line' each autumn made it difficult to judge improvements in rail reliability over a period of less than a year (or more)...





...and in education, exogenous seasonal factors (influenza) could render an entire year's data unreliable.

#### **II.b. Monitoring Departmental Performance**






# Prime Ministers' Delivery Unit DELIVERY REPORT


			Assessment	Overall Judgement				
Dept	July 2004	Degree of challenge	Quality of planning, implementation and performance management	Capacity to drive progress	Stage of Delivery	Likelihood of Delivery		Rank (out of 21)
Α	PSA 1	L	G	G	3	G	$\Box$	= 1
В	PSA 2	L	G	AG	2	G	حرا	= 1
С	PSA 3	Н	AG	AG	3	G		3
D	PSA 4	Н	G	AG	3	AG		4
Α	PSA 5	VH	G	AG	2	AG		5
В	PSA 6	Н	AG	AG	3	AG		6
С	PSA 7	Н	AG	AG	2	AG		= 7
D	PSA 8	Н	AG	AG	3	AG	≻	= 7
Α	PSA 9	Н	AG	AG	2	AG	را	= 7
В	PSA 10	VH	AG	AG	2	AG		= 10
С	PSA 11	VH	AG	AG	2	AG		= 10
D	PSA 12	Н	AR	AG	3	AG		12
Α	PSA 13	VH	AR	AG	2	AR		13
В	PSA 14	VH	AG	AR	2	AR	רו	= 14
С	PSA 15	VH	AG	AR	2	AR	کرا	= 14
D	PSA 16	VH	AR	AR	2	AR	l	= 16
Α	PSA 17	VH	AR	AR	2	AR	کر ا	= 16
В	PSA 18	Н	AG	AR	3	R	רו	= 18
С	PSA 19	Н	AG	AR	2	R	ح ا	= 18
D	PSA 20	VH	AG	AR	3	R		20
Α	PSA 21	VH	R	R	2	R		21

# II.b. Monitoring Departmental Performance Lesson # 6: Know what your system looks like from the bottom-up





In 2003, the Dept of Health's 12 PSAs were being translated into 208 different targets as they cascaded down the delivery chain...




...and while Dept for Education had half the number of central targets, head teachers faced an even bigger compliance burden from other tiers of Government


#### **II.c. Holding Government to Account**


#### **Lesson # 7:** Make use of national audit institutions











#### **II.c. Holding Government to Account**

#### **Lesson # 8:** Don't overestimate public interest






#### II.d. Linking Performance back to Spending Decisions **Lesson # 9:** The spending-outcomes relationship will always be a 'gray box'



#### Children's Benefits and Children in Poverty

1994-95 to 2005-06



# II.d. Linking Performance back to Spending Decisions Lesson # 10: Be realistic about where performance can make a difference



